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REBECCA S. EISENBERG

Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and
Mathematical Algorithms
The Supreme Court’s decision last Term in Mayo v. Prometheus left
considerable uncertainty as to the boundaries of patentable subject matter for
molecular diagnostic inventions. First, the Court took an expansive approach to what
counts as an unpatentable natural law by applying that term to the relationship set
forth in the challenged patent between a patient’s levels of a drug metabolite and the
indication of a need to adjust the patient’s drug dosage. And second, in evaluating
whether the patent claims add enough to this unpatentable natural law to be patent
eligible, the Court did not consult precedents concerning the patentability of claims
involving natural laws and natural products. Instead, it turned to two seemingly
inconsistent decisions that reached opposing conclusions concerning the patent
eligibility of industrial methods that used mathematical algorithms. The Court’s
analysis invites challenges to many issued patents, while offering little guidance for
resolving them. This Term, in the Association for Molecular Pathology case, the
Court has another opportunity to clarify the meaning of its exclusion of natural
phenomena from patent eligibility.
The promise of personalized medicine cannot be delivered without new
precision diagnostic tools for tailoring treatment interventions to the needs of
individual patients. The recent decision by the Supreme Court in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,1 raises doubts about the
eligibility of these diagnostic tools for patent protection and calls into question
the validity of many previously issued patents. In the Association for Molecular

1.

No. 10-1150 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1150.pdf
(to be reported at 132 S. Ct. 1289).
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Pathology case,2 the Court has an opportunity to clarify the applicable rules by
identifying the kinds of diagnostic inventions that fall within patentable
subject matter as well as those that are excluded from patent protection.
Otherwise, the federal courts are likely to face a stream of appeals on patentable
subject matter in the years ahead.
The patent in Mayo v. Prometheus claimed a method of optimizing the
dosage of thiopurine drugs for treatment of immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorders (such as irritable bowel syndrome). The method involved comparing
a patient’s levels of two drug metabolites with reference values specified in the
patent.3 Observed levels below certain values would indicate a need to raise the
dosage, while observed levels above different values would indicate a need to
lower it.4 The Supreme Court thought that the patent impermissibly claimed
laws of nature, “namely, relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug
will prove ineffective or cause harm.”5 Other steps in the process recited in the
claim (such as administering a thiopurine drug to a patient or determining the
patient’s levels of drug metabolites) consisted of “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists in the field.”6 In the
Court’s view, those process steps did not add enough to the natural laws to
classify the claim as a patent-eligible application of the natural laws rather than
an impermissible “patent upon the natural law itself.”7
Two key moves in the Court’s analysis cast a shadow of uncertainty over
the validity of patents on diagnostic inventions. First, the Court took an
expansive approach to what counts as a “law of nature” by attaching that label
to the relationship set forth in the patent between a patient’s drug metabolite
levels and the indication of a need to adjust the patient’s drug dosage. Because
“laws of nature” are not patentable, the Court asked “whether the claims do

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
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Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP II), 689 F. 3d 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133
S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 12-398).
Mayo, slip op. at 4-5.
Id.
Id. at 8. Patent claims define the boundaries of a patent right in roughly the same way that
“metes and bounds” define the boundaries of rights in real property. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(2006) (“The [patent] specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.”).
Mayo, slip op. at 2.
Id. at 3.
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significantly more than simply describe these natural relations.”8 Second, to
answer this question, the Court did not consider prior cases on patents that
involved natural laws and natural products, but turned instead to two prior
cases involving computer-implemented industrial processes—Parker v. Flook9
and Diamond v. Diehr10—as the “the cases most directly on point.”11 Those two
cases reach opposing conclusions on similar facts and are difficult to reconcile,
as Justice Stevens observed in dissent in Diehr.12 Taken together, the Court’s
twin moves invite patent challenges while offering only vague guidance for
resolving them.
The Court’s characterization of the relationship between the observed
metabolite levels and the need to adjust drug dosage as a “natural law” is
puzzling. The Court acknowledged that it takes human action to administer a
thiopurine drug to a patient and thereby trigger a “manifestation of this
relation in a particular person.”13 But the Court nonetheless asserted that “the
relation itself exists in principle apart from any human action” because
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body according to “entirely
natural processes.”14
Perhaps what the Court meant was that a patient’s reaction to a drug is
controlled by biological processes that follow certain natural laws. The same is
true of any method of using a drug in medical treatment, and yet many
decisions have upheld the patent eligibility of such methods. Indeed, as the
Court noted, “a typical patent on . . . a new way of using an existing drug” is
patentable on the ground that it is limited to “particular applications of
[natural] laws” rather than an impermissible patent on the natural law itself.15
The Court did not explain why a method of treatment that makes use of a
patient’s biological response to a drug is a patent-eligible application of a
natural law, while a diagnostic method that makes use of this same biological
response is not.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

Id. at 8.
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Mayo, slip op. at 1.
450 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 961 (1986) (criticizing the “awkward distinctions and
seemingly irreconcilable results of the case law” on the patent eligibility of computerimplemented inventions).
Mayo, slip op. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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The Court may see the diagnostic method as involving too little value
added by humans beyond the observation of a natural biological phenomenon
to qualify as a human invention. However, even if natural laws determine a
patient’s response to drug therapy, nature does not determine when those
consequences indicate a need to raise or lower the drug dosage. Nature does
not specify when the miseries of irritable bowel syndrome outweigh the risks of
myelosuppression and liver toxicity from the use of thiopurine drugs. At most,
nature supplies the raw data, while human judgment is necessary to interpret
the data and to guide medical intervention. The technological contribution of
this particular invention is to quantify and systematize that judgment to
improve treatment. Other methods are possible, and they might do a better or
worse job of optimizing treatment. Indeed, after using the Prometheus
Laboratories invention under license for a time, the defendant, Mayo
Collaborative Services, decided to change the metabolite values that it thought
called for adjusting the dosage (although the change was not enough to avoid
infringement liability if the claims had been upheld). Those different views
about what drug metabolite levels are problematic show that the levels recited
in the claims represent a human technological choice that goes beyond mere
recital of a natural law.
Many prior cases have struggled with the distinction between patenteligible human inventions and patent-ineligible natural products and
phenomena.16 Rather than turning to those cases for guidance, the Court made
its second puzzling move: it turned to two decisions from 1978 and 1981
concerning the patentability of methods that recite “mathematical algorithms”
to resolve the patent eligibility of claims that recite “laws of nature.”
Parker v. Flook held that a method using a mathematical algorithm to
update alarm limits for process variables in a catalytic conversion process was
not patentable subject matter.17 On the other hand, Diamond v. Diehr held that
a method of operating a rubber molding press using a mathematical algorithm
to repeatedly recalculate the cure time was patentable subject matter.18 To the
Diehr majority, the relevant distinction was that Flook had sought to patent a

16.

17.
18.
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See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (finding that bacteria transformed to
incorporate multiple naturally occurring DNA plasmids were patent eligible); Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (finding that a mixed culture of rootnodule bacteria selected for the property of not inhibiting one another’s effectiveness was
not patent eligible); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1958) (finding that a purified Vitamin B12 composition that was clinically superior to the
product in its natural state was patent eligible).
437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981).
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method of computing a number, whereas Diehr sought to patent a method of
curing synthetic rubber.19 But upon closer examination the primary difference
seemed to be a matter of claim-drafting, as Justice Stevens pointedly noted in
his dissent in Diehr.20
The Court in Mayo v. Prometheus identified a different distinction in its own
paraphrase of these inconsistent holdings, explaining that the patent-ineligible
claim in Flook merely recited a mathematical formula—“the equivalent of a
natural law”21—followed by a bare instruction to “apply it.”22 By contrast, the
patent-eligible claim in Diehr recited additional steps that “apparently added
. . . something that in terms of patent law’s objectives had significance” and
“transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula.”23 The
claims in Mayo v. Prometheus struck the Court as tantamount to a recital of a
natural law followed by a bare instruction to “apply it” because, once the Court
sets aside as “natural laws” the metabolite levels specified in the claims, the
other steps “add nothing specific to the laws of nature other than what is wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in
the field.”24 But that observation does not explain the distinction between
Diehr and Flook: both of those cases involved methods that applied new
mathematical algorithms to familiar process steps.25 Moreover, the Court in
Diehr explicitly rejected the approach of excluding conventional process steps

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 209 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[Diehr’s] method of updating the curing time
calculation is strikingly reminiscent of the method of updating alarm limits that Dale Flook
sought to patent. . . . In Flook, the digital computer repetitively recalculated the ‘alarm
limit’—a number that might signal the need to terminate or modify the catalytic conversion
process; in this case, the digital computer repetitively recalculates the correct curing time—a
number that signals the time when the synthetic rubber molding press should open. The
essence of the claimed discovery in both cases was an algorithm that could be programmed
on a digital computer.”).
See Mayo, slip op. at 11.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at
208 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals
expressly found that ‘the only difference between the conventional methods of operating a
molding press and that claimed in [the] application rests in those steps of the claims that
relate to the calculation incident to the solution of the mathematical problem or formula
used to control the mold heater and the automatic opening of the press.’ This finding was
not disturbed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and is clearly correct.” (second
alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citing In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 984 (C.C.P.A.
1979), which also quotes the board’s opinion)).
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from consideration in determining whether a claim recites patentable subject
matter.26 The Court in Mayo v. Prometheus did not make a serious effort to
compare the additional steps in the claims before it to those in Flook and Diehr.
Instead, it left future courts to puzzle over how far Mayo v. Prometheus has
reanimated these ghosts from the past and how to resolve their inconsistencies.
In its day, Diehr marked a turning point between an earlier era of
parsimonious patent protection for computer-implemented inventions and a
new era of expanded patent eligibility.27 Subsequent case law offers little
guidance in resolving the inconsistency between the two cases because, at the
time, Diehr functioned more as a claim-drafting guide to avoid the outcome in
Flook than as a counterexample to explain the limitations of Flook.
By returning to the elusive distinction between Flook and Diehr after more
than three decades and assigning to those cases the new task of discerning the
boundaries of patent eligibility for all claims that recite “laws of nature,” the
Court in Mayo v. Prometheus seemed to be on a new mission. Rather than
restricting the reach of judicial limitations on patentable subject matter by
affirming the claims before it, the Court appeared to be narrowing the
boundaries of patentable subject matter in a field that has long taken for
granted the availability of patent protection for its innovations. By broadly
defining “laws of nature” to include human interpretation of biological
responses to medical interventions, the Court seemed to call into question the
validity of many previously allowed claims, inviting more litigation contesting
patentable subject matter and drawing courts into the murky waters of Diehr
and Flook.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to step into those
murky waters when it considered the patent eligibility of advances in medical
diagnostics in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office.28 That case challenged the patent eligibility of claims to DNA sequences

26.

27.

28.
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Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89 (majority opinion) (“It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into
old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.
This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process
may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known
. . . . The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within . . . possibly
patentable subject matter.”).
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, The Story of Diamond v. Diehr: Toward Patenting Software, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 194, 212-18 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP II), 689 F.3d 1303,
1333-37 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 12-398).
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for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated with breast cancer susceptibility as
well as claims to diagnostic methods and drug-screening methods that make
use of these sequences. The Federal Circuit has ruled on the case twice, once29
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus and again30 on
remand for reconsideration in light of that decision. Each member of the panel
wrote separately each time, presenting a range of competing views to guide the
Court in its consideration of the issues presented.
The Federal Circuit panel was divided on the patent eligibility of the claims
to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA molecules, the most prominent issue in the
case and the only issue on which the Court has granted certiorari.31 Yet each
panel member joined Judge Lourie’s analysis of the method claims,
unanimously holding that (1) claims to diagnostic methods of “comparing” or
“analyzing” DNA sequences from a tissue sample with reference sequences
were not patent eligible because they are only “abstract mental steps” and that
(2) claims to drug-screening methods that compare the growth rate of cells
transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the presence or absence of a
potential cancer therapy were patent-eligible chemical processes.32 One might
have expected the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus
to play a significant role in the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the method
claims—especially given that the Court explicitly remanded for reconsideration
in light of that decision—yet its teachings had little apparent impact on the
analysis of the claims. Judge Lourie acknowledged that his analysis followed
the Court’s holding in Mayo v. Prometheus, but not its reasoning.33 He did not
seek to resolve whether the diagnostic method claims covered “laws of nature,”
instead holding the claims invalid because “comparing” or “analyzing” two
gene sequences is an abstract mental process.34 In upholding the patent
eligibility of the drug-screening method claims, Judge Lourie focused on the
fact that the method used human-modified bacteria that had been transformed
with an altered BRCA1 gene. He considered it irrelevant to the patentablesubject-matter analysis that the other process steps of comparing growth rates

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (AMP I), 653 F.3d 1329,
1355-58 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (No. 11-725).
AMP II, 689 F.3d 1303.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012) (mem.).
AMP I, 653 F.3d at 1355-58.
AMP II, 689 F.3d at 1333.
Id. at 1333-34.
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in the cells were conventional.35 Responding to the Court’s emphasis in Mayo v.
Prometheus on the insufficiency of conventional steps to establish patentable
subject matter, Judge Lourie noted that most chemical processes involve the
use of known process steps and reactions and that this should not defeat patent
eligibility where the process makes use of novel materials that are not naturally
occurring.36 The Federal Circuit’s analysis of those claims was straightforward,
although it did not even purport to follow the reasoning of Mayo v. Prometheus.
On the other hand, although the Federal Circuit’s reasoning was different, its
ultimate decision on the patent eligibility of the method claims was broadly
consistent with the Court’s reinforcement of traditional exclusions from
patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court declined to review the Federal
Circuit’s decision on the method claims, granting certiorari solely on the
question whether human genes are patentable.37 Perhaps the Court’s
acquiescence in the Federal Circuit’s alternative analytical approach indicates
that it is willing to defer to that court’s expertise in patent matters so long as it
seems to be vigorously policing the subject-matter boundaries of the patent
system.
It remains to be seen how the Court will review the Federal Circuit panel’s
split decision affirming the patent eligibility of claims to isolated DNA
molecules. The three separate opinions of the panel members on this question
found limited guidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v.
Prometheus.38 Each opinion drew primarily upon prior cases on the exclusion
for natural products and processes that the Court had largely ignored.39 Those
cases are hardly a model of consistency and clarity, yet they provide a more
coherent baseline than the cases on the exclusion for mathematical algorithms.
In reviewing the latest disposition of Association for Molecular Pathology, the
Supreme Court could begin to restore predictability to the rules of patentable
subject matter by setting aside Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr and

35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
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Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1325.
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 12-398).
See, e.g., AMP II, 689 F.3d at 1325 (Lourie, J.) (“Mayo does not control the question of
patent-eligibility of such claims. They are compositions of matter, expressly authorized as
suitable patent-eligible subject matter in § 101.”); id. at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in part)
(“Prometheus did not, however, overturn Funk Brothers or Chakrabarty; cases clearly more
analogous to the one before us.”); cf. id. at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. does not decide this case, but the Court’s analysis is nonetheless
instructive.” (citation omitted)).
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
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turning instead to these more pertinent authorities on the patentability of
natural products and processes.
Perhaps the most important contribution of Diamond v. Diehr to the
jurisprudence of patentable subject matter was that for the first time the Court
identified claims to computer-implemented inventions that it considered
patent eligible, thereby providing patent applicants with a model for patenting
computer-implemented inventions properly. The Court now has an
opportunity to make a similar contribution to the understanding of patentable
subject matter for diagnostic inventions in Association for Molecular Pathology.
The plaintiffs in that case have challenged the validity of multiple claims to
DNA inventions that reflect different approaches to defining what constitutes a
patentable invention. The three opinions from the panel offer distinct
approaches to the patent-eligibility issues raised by these different claims,
providing the Court with an unusually rich record for clarifying the distinction
between unpatentable natural phenomena and patentable human inventions. If
the Court can identify claims that it considers patent eligible, it will bring
greater clarity to the issue than if it only identifies claims that lie outside the
boundaries of patentable subject matter. In the absence of such clarity, the
Court can expect many more appeals as the Patent and Trademark Office and
the courts try to determine what the Supreme Court will deem patentable.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg is the Robert and Barbara Luciano Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School.
Preferred citation: Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics,
Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341 (2013),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/04/01/eisenberg.html.
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